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Special Commentary

Fighting the “Islamic State”
The Case for US Ground Forces
David E. Johnson
Abstract: This article argues counterinsurgency wars are not analogous to the challenges presented by the Islamic State. The United
States needs to accept the nature of the war it is in, and undertake
a clear and comprehensive assessment of the means necessary for
strategic success. Such an assessment will make apparent the need to
commit US ground combat forces.1

T

he rise of the Islamic State has forced policy makers to confront
uncomfortable questions: What will it take to defeat the Islamic
State? What is the nature of the current conflict against the
Islamic State? Can the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), bolstered by US and
allied air power, advisers, special forces – almost everything short of
ground combat forces – defeat the Islamic State? The difficulty the Iraqis
experienced in taking Tikrit and the recent abandonment of Ramadi
should be instructive, as was the premature announcement by US Central
Command of a coming ISF spring 2015 offensive to retake Mosul, which
was followed by an admission that the ISF is not yet ready for the kind
of fight Mosul would entail.2
Many have already commented on the need to have all US options
on the table to defeat the Islamic State. Retired Marine Corps General
James Mattis recently wrote US strategy should include ground combat
forces “to achieve our war aims.”3 This article explains why US ground
forces are not just a better option than the ISF, but absolutely necessary
for achieving US policy objectives against the Islamic State.

Does Our Strategy Fit the War We Are In?

All students of strategy have had the ends-ways-means catechism
drummed into them at some point in their education. Assessing the
US strategy for the war with the Islamic State from this perspective is
useful in reaching an understanding of what needs to be done to defeat
the Islamic State. Additionally, it will illustrate the continuing challenges

1     This article is derived from my commentary in War on the Rocks which argues US ground
forces are necessary to defeat the Islamic State, and that a crucial test would come with the battle to
retake Mosul. This essay expands on that premise, even though it is being written as events unfold
on the ground in Iraq. See David Johnson, “Means Matter: Competent Ground Forces and the
Fight Against ISIL,” War on the Rocks, March 19, 2015. This essay incorporates much of this earlier
commentary.
2     Loveday Morris, “Iraqi Offensive for Tikrit Stalls as Casualties Mount,” Washington Post, March
16, 2015; and Robert Burns, “Pentagon Calls Mosul Briefing a Mistake by CentCom,” Associated Press,
March 3, 2015; and Nancy A. Youssef, “Exclusive: Pentagon Doubts Its Own ISIS War Plan,” Daily
Beast, February 20, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/20/pentagon-doubtsits-own-isis-war-plan.html.
3      James Mattis, “Using Military Force Against ISIS,” Defining Ideas, March 4, 2015, http://www.
hoover.org/research/using-military-force-against-isis.
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in post-9/11 strategy formulation and, in particular, the chasm between
desired ends and deployed means.
President Obama, in his February 11, 2015 letter to the Congress
requesting an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to
fight the Islamic State, set forth clear “ends” for his strategy: “to degrade
and defeat ISIL.”4 To this point in the fight against the Islamic State,
the US “way” has been limited to “a systematic campaign of airstrikes
against ISIL in Iraq and Syria” and supporting various anti-Islamic State
security forces.5 American “means” are limited to air power, advisers,
and US support to the Iraqis. The other means beyond US supporting forces—the “boots on the ground”—include the ISF, Kurdish
Peshmerga and Sunni and Shi’a militias, the latter backed by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps. Indeed, Major General Qasem Soleimaini,
commander of the Iranian Quds Force, was at one point directing the
offensive to retake Tikrit.6 This is problematic in terms of US strategy
in the region, but also creates sectarian tensions with Iranians deeply
involved in taking Sunni areas.
The AUMF explicitly states it “would not authorize long-term,
large-scale ground combat operations like those our Nation conducted
in Iraq and Afghanistan.” This is the fundamental flaw in conceptualizing a strategy for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq—seeing this new
fight as similar in character to the past 14 years of war in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Clausewitz is instructive when he stresses that war is “an instrument of policy. . . . This way of looking at it will show us how wars must
vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give
rise to them.” 7 Quite simply, the United States needs to understand the
war it is in and the adversary it faces in the Islamic State.
The Islamic State is not an insurgency like the United States
fought from 2003 until its departure from Iraq. Rather, it is an aspiring
proto-state bent on taking and holding territory. Thus, the centrality of
“protecting the people” from the insurgents that is the cornerstone of
US counterinsurgency doctrine—the “way” the United States eventually approached the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—is irrelevant to the
Islamic State itself. Protecting the Iraqi population from the Islamic
State is important, but that will be accomplished through conventional
operations that destroy the Islamic State and seize the territory it currently occupies in Iraq.
To date, air power and limited Iraqi ground operations have degraded
the Islamic State and put it at risk when it moves in the open. In response,
the Islamic State has gone to ground in urban areas. This creates a new
reality on the ground and a problem that cannot be solved through airstrikes alone, though retired US Air Force Lieutenant General David
Deptula has argued that a stepped-up air campaign could defeat the
4      Barack Obama, “Letter from the President–Authorization for the Use of United States
Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” The White House,
February 11, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-presidentauthorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection.
5      Ibid.
6      Paul McCleary, “Iranian General again in Iraq for Tikrit Offensive,” Defense News, March 2,
2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/blog/intercepts/2015/03/02/iraq-iran
-is-war-terrorism/24270363/.
7      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.
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Islamic State.8 Islamic State fighters are now able to conceal themselves
in the terrain and amongst the people of the cities they occupy. They
are more akin to Hamas in Gaza or the North Vietnamese Army in
Hue than they are to an insurgency of the type we fought in Iraq and
are fighting in Afghanistan. These urban areas are where the Islamic
State will have to be defeated if the United States is to realize President
Obama’s stated policy objective. US success is, therefore, inextricably
linked to the success of ISF ground combat operations against the
Islamic State in the difficult tactical environment of a densely populated
urban battlefield. As currently structured, if the ISF fails, so does the
US strategy.

ISF Is Not the Army We Need

If one accepts the fight against the Islamic State requires ground
combat to defeat a conventional force that is holding territory, the
crucial next step is deciding the appropriate “means” to execute that
“way.” Although the administration continues to emphasize all options
are on the table, the letter from the President to Congress requesting an
AUMF specifically states “Local forces, rather than US military forces,
should be deployed to conduct such operations.”9 Furthermore, the role
of US ground forces is extremely limited in the AUMF:
The authorization I propose would provide the flexibility to conduct
ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances, such as
rescue operations involving US or coalition personnel or the use of special
operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership. It would
also authorize the use of US forces in situations where ground combat
operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and
sharing, missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational
planning and other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces.10

Although some like General Mattis have argued for the need to
include US ground forces in the fight, most have limited this discussion
to providing advisors and tactical air controllers at lower levels to the
ISF.11 John Nagl has been a consistent voice in this debate arguing:
We are going to have to put those American troops embedded inside Iraqi
units, in close support of those Iraqi units, in order to enable and empower
them to expel the Islamic State from that country in a reasonable period
of time. That’s not an occupation, it will be Iraqi troops doing the fighting,
it will be American troops in close support, calling in airstrikes, providing
intelligence, providing a number of the enablers and the logistical support
8      See Sydney J. Freedburg, Jr., “Trench Warfare With Wings: Can ISIL Airstrikes Go Beyond
Attrition?” Breaking Defense, April 9, 2015. In this article Deptula, a noted airpower theorist and
practitioner, argues for a return to first principles: Why is the road between Raqqa [the ISIL ‘capital,’
in Syria] and Mosul, for example, still open? Why is electricity not terminated in either city? Wouldn’t
shutting down the electrical grid harm the local civilian population? Yes, Deptula said, but not
to an extent that would violate the laws of war. “This is one of the problems, there’s been more
attention to the avoidance of collateral damage and civilian casualties than there has been to the
accomplishment of eliminating ISIL,” he said. In fact, he argued, “in an echo of long-ago airpower
theorist Giulio Douhet — that bringing the war home to ISIL-controlled populations might turn
them against their occupiers.”
9      Obama, “Letter from the President–Authorization for the Use of United States Armed
Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.”
10      Ibid.
11      Mattis, “Using Military Force Against ISIS.” General Mattis chafed at restricting the means in
the fight against the Islamic State, writing “When fighting a barbaric enemy who strikes fear into the
hearts of many, especially those living in close proximity to this foe, we must not reassure that enemy
in advance that it will not face the fiercest, most skillful and ethical combat force in the world.”
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that America is so good at, and it will enable the Iraqis to do the fighting
and the dying. So I am talking about the total force of some 10-20 thousand
American advisors—clearly, an insufficient number to occupy the country
the size of Iraq, but sufficient to provide a steel spine that will provide
support to an Iraqi military that collapsed under pressure last year and that
has not been completely rebuilt, that cannot conduct this fight on its own.12

Thus, the central assumption—and the Achilles’ heel—in the
current US strategy is this: with foreign training and assistance, the
ISF will eventually be able to provide sufficient on-the-ground military
means to achieve US strategic ends. The question yet to be asked and
answered (without spin) is: What if the ISF cannot be trained and advised
to achieve the level of competency necessary to roll back the Islamic
State?
Ironically, the way the United States defeated Saddam Hussein in
2003—destroying the enemy through joint combined arms maneuver—
is what is needed now. The flaw in the 2003 strategy was failing to plan
for what would replace the Hussein regime and letting Iraq descend into
chaos; but that is not the central issue now. There is an Iraqi government
in place that the United States intends to sustain. Yet, debates about the
way to defeat the Islamic State are frequently, and incorrectly, trapped in
the counterinsurgency model of the past decade, as can be seen in this
statement by Janine Davidson at a recent Council on Foreign Relations
event: “the people in Iraq feel like this civil war has insurgency-like elements, meaning people are embedded among the people, [if] the fighters
are embedded, then there are counterinsurgency-like approaches.” Max
Boot, Davidson’s fellow panelist at the event, agreed: “I think a COIN
[counterinsurgency] strategy is basically the only strategy that has any
track record of success. And it’s not an easy strategy, but it’s the only
strategy that has any track record of success in dealing with an enemy
that is entrenched among the people.”13
Will the ISF be able to drive the Islamic State out of Iraq? Operations
in Tikrit, which had to be stopped because of lack of progress and high
casualties and could only resume once US airpower was employed,
provide some indication of the lack of competence of the ISF for the
task of defeating the Islamic State.14 Furthermore, the brunt of the fighting was reportedly done by Shi’a militias as the ISF was not up to the
task. Nevertheless, the key test will be the retaking of Mosul, a much
larger Sunni city of some 1.5 million residents. As already noted, doubts
about the readiness of the ISF for this fight ostensibly pushed back plans
for an offensive to take Mosul from this spring to an undetermined date
in the future. There is likely to be a long wait: reports from US trainers indicate ISF is in bad shape. Lieutenant Colonel John Schwemmer,
a US Army officer training Iraqis at Camp Taji in Iraq, was recently
taken aback at the poor state of the ISF, observing: “It’s pretty incredible . . . I was kind of surprised. What training did they have after we
left?”15 Finally, there appears to be doubt among at least some senior
12      John Nagl, interview, “Americans Have to Die On Battlefield to Destroy ISIS—US Military
Strategist,” RT, February 16, 2015, http://rt.com/shows/sophieco/232635-us-isis-middle-east.
13      Council on Foreign Relations, “What to Do About ISIS,” transcript, March 31, 2015, http://
www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/do-isis/p36333, accessed April 15, 2015).
14      Morris, “Iraqi Offensive for Tikrit Stalls as Casualties Mount.”
15      Rod Nordland, “US Soldiers, Back in Iraq, Find Security Forces in Disrepair,” New York
Times, April 14, 2015..
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Iraqi officers whether ISF can take Mosul without US ground forces.
Major General Najim Abdullah al-Jubouri, the individual selected by
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to command operations to liberate Nineveh, said: “I think it would be very difficult to defeat ISIS in
Nineweh without American forces.”16
There is reason for concern. The ISF that fled in the face of the
Islamic State’s offensive in 2014 bolted because it was designed largely as
an internal security force that “did little more than staff checkpoints.”17
The ISF could only operate effectively with significant US assistance
when facing anything other than moderate-scale internal threats. It is
incapable of the combined arms maneuver required to defeat the Islamic
State. The tough urban fights in Iraq—Fallujah (2004) and Sadr City
(2008)—were dominated by US forces with modest ISF participation.
The battle for Basra (2008), while Iraqi conceived and led, required
massive US assistance to succeed. The US ground formations in these key
battles were not just “boots on the ground.” They were skilled, professional forces capable of something the ISF is not: the expert execution of
highly synchronized joint combined arms operations. This competence
is paramount in defeating determined adversaries and avoiding friendly
and unwarranted noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. This is
the ground force needed to defeat the Islamic State. US advisers cannot
transplant these competencies into the ISF in a relatively short time, if
ever, even if the ISF did not have all of its other challenges to overcome.
Indeed, eight years of large-scale efforts from 2003 to 2011 failed to do
so. Nor can it do the heavy lifting in intelligence, fires, and planning for
the ISF; it is not capable of this level of sophisticated synchronization of
joint combined arms.

The Singular Importance of US Ground Forces

The 2008 Battle of Sadr City is perhaps the most illustrative example
of the capability chasm between US ground forces and the ISF—or
almost any other military in the world, for that matter. In that battle the
US Army’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, destroyed
the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia in an intense ground fight. Sadr City
contained over 2 million Iraqi noncombatants, with an estimated 6,000
to 8,000 JAM fighters operating in their midst. The problem was similar
to that which forces trying to retake Mosul will face: How to defeat a
relatively small number of fighters without wantonly killing the civilians
amongst whom they are hiding and destroying the city.18 To reverse a
famous quote reported by Peter Arnett during the Vietnam War, “How
do you save the city without destroying it?”19
In the Battle of Sadr City, the US Army created a condition intolerable to JAM by sealing off the city with a concrete wall and using
the protected mobility and firepower of M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley
infantry fighting vehicles to maneuver against JAM. This threatened
16      Thomas E. Ricks, “Former FP [Foreign Policy] Roundtable Participant Tapped to Lead Iraqi
Offensive to Re-take Mosul — But Will He Ask for US Ground Forces?” Foreign Policy, April 22, 2015,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/22/former-fp-roundtable-participant-tapped-to-lead-iraqioffensive-to-re-take-mosul-but-will-he-ask-for-u-s-ground-forces.
17      Ibid.; and Nordland, “US Soldiers, Back in Iraq, Find Security Forces in Disrepair.”
18      David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City:
Reimagining Urban Combat (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013).
19      “Major Describe Moves,” New York Times, February 8, 1968, 14.
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JAM’s source of sustenance and it came out to fight US forces to stop
the progress of the wall. When JAM fighters became visible they
were destroyed with discriminate firepower. This is not unlike Israeli
ground operations in Gaza during Operations Cast Lead and Protective
Edge—competent ground forces, enabled by a joint system, can create
conditions that force an adversary to fight at great disadvantage.
Simultaneous with the ground fight against the JAM militia, the
3rd Brigade executed a high-technology, complex hunt for JAM rocket
launcher crews who were firing from Sadr City into the Baghdad Green
Zone, where the US Embassy was located. The brigade staff, augmented
by Air Force officers, integrated multiple intelligence means, unmanned
aerial surveillance and attack systems (Predator and Shadow), Apache
helicopters, Air Force fighters, and artillery to hunt and destroy JAM
rocket launchers.
The ISF was also in the Sadr City fight, but it played a secondary
infantry role, assisted by US advisers, focused on consolidating gains
and occupying Sadr City once the fighting ended. That was all that could
be expected of the ISF, because it could not execute synchronized joint
operations, nor did it have the capabilities—the US military provided all
the joint fires, technical intelligence, and overhead surveillance. While
isolating Mosul might not be the best strategy, the fight for Sadr City
illustrates the unique effectiveness US ground forces in orchestrating
and executing a joint fight could have in the fight against the Islamic
State.
Competent ground forces are fundamental to the joint force equation for finding and defeating adversaries. Attempting to impart this
competence to another ground force is folly. The ISF of 2008, before
then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki riddled it with crony appointments and corruption, was more competent than the ISF that fled from
the Islamic State last year.
Still, it is unimaginable that the ISF of 2008 could have done what
US forces did in Sadr City or Fallujah, for that matter. It took years
of effort to create the ISF of 2008 and the adversaries they joined us
in fighting were less formidable than the Islamic State. Why would we
imagine the ISF ground forces will be able to take Mosul this year?

The Fallacy of the Advisor Option

This is a central fallacy in US advisory efforts in areas with ongoing
conflicts. Our advisory efforts may create infantry formations that can
operate within the context of a supporting US joint system that provides air, artillery, intelligence, logistical support—and ground combat
forces. Advisors are essentially a link for the local security forces into
that system, which also has US ground forces in the event of the need
for reinforcement. This is essentially the system we had in Iraq during
the surge. It is not dissimilar to the program of Vietnamization during
the Vietnam War. So long as the South Vietnamese had access to US
enablers, particularly airpower, they could endure as they did during the
North Vietnamese failed Easter Offensive in 1972. Three years later,
absent this US system and sustained security assistance support, the
South Vietnamese military deteriorated and collapsed under a conventional attack by North Vietnam. In the case of the ISF, the Islamic State
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(a much less significant foe than the North Vietnamese Army) was able
to overrun much of Iraq. Finally, in the past when the United States built
militaries that gradually became truly joint, combined arms-capable, the
US army provided military assistance and forces in largely benign security environments for decades (e.g., South Korea). It strains credulity to
believe we can create an ISF capable of effective operations in an urban
area like Mosul in short order, even if we provide intelligence, planning,
and fires.

The Perils of Sectarianism

Trying to take Sunni cities with combinations of Shi’a militias,
Peshmerga, and ISF forces would also present another challenge. None
of these forces would be trusted by the Sunni populations, which might
therefore continue to support the Islamic State. Nor would they trust
each other. In the eyes of the locals, US ground forces are least likely to
have sectarian agendas and, thus, are potentially trustworthy—or at least
honest brokers. The aftermath of the ISF victory in Tikrit reinforces this
view. As Reuters reported, “the looting and violence in Tikrit threaten
to tarnish [Iraqi Prime Minister] Abadi’s victory. It risks signaling to
Sunni Iraqis that the central government is weak and not trustworthy
enough to recapture other territory held by Islamic State, including the
much larger city of Mosul.”20 Future depredations against the Sunnis
also risk exacerbating the already deep sectarian divides that would
undermine a central pillar of our strategy in Iraq of creating an inclusive
Iraqi government.
This brings us back to the importance of having the means to achieve
our ends. If the ISF is incapable of defeating the Islamic State in the cities
where ISIL fighters have gone to ground, then the only reliable means
available are US ground combat forces. They have all the skills in joint
combined arms warfare the ISF lacks. US Army armor and mechanized
infantry formations should be at the heart of this joint task force, just as
they were in Sadr City, to provide US forces with the mobile, protected,
and discriminate firepower that will overmatch and quickly defeat the
Islamic State. If the United States is unwilling to deploy ground combat
forces, the end state of a “degraded and destroyed” Islamic State is at
risk.

Capacity Matters—Two Recent Examples

Two recent cases when the United States chose to embark on a new
strategy in the midst of failing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide
lessons about the criticality of providing sufficient means. The first
instance was when President George W. Bush announced on January
10, 2007 that he was sending 30,000 additional troops, including five
more US Army brigades, to Iraq. Quite simply, the strategy of turning
the war over to the Iraqis—“standing down as they stand up”—was not
working.21 These surge forces were the critical to a new strategy for Iraq
that made possible the establishment of a level of internal security that

20      “After Iraqi Forces Take Tikrit, a Wave of Looting and Lynching,” Reuters, April 3, 2015,.
21      Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq (New
York: Penguin Press, 2009), 74-128.
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the Iraqis could maintain independently and allowed the United States
to withdraw in 2011.22
The second case is the increased commitment in Afghanistan that
General Stanley McChrystal designed for the Obama administration in
2009. The ends for the campaign were clear: denying al Qaeda a safe
haven, reversing the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government for the long haul.
The ways were also understood—population-centric COIN. What was
inadequate were the means allocated to achieve the strategy. According
to US COIN doctrine, the number of security forces available to execute
the strategy was insufficient and the ends of the strategy were not
attained.23 Today, over four years after the surge in Afghanistan, the
United States has had to revisit its plans to withdraw US forces from
Afghanistan.24

Moving Forward

There is understandable reluctance to deploy US ground forces to
fight the Islamic State, given US experiences since 2003. However, the
military objective against the Islamic State would not be nation-building
or counterinsurgency, but rather removing the Islamic State from Iraq.
The surest means of attaining this strategic objective is with the introduction of US ground combat forces and the necessary sustainment
packages to support them. Politically, this will be extremely difficult
both domestically and internationally, given likely Iraqi objections and
the substantial Iranian presence in Iraq.
The most difficult political issue, however, is mustering American
political will for a US ground commitment against the Islamic State. The
President will have to make the American people understand why US
ground forces are the only sure means available to achieve our national
objectives. President Bush did this in 2007 for Iraq; President Obama
did it 2009 for Afghanistan. It is, however, clear the American people
understand the threat posed by the Islamic State. A recent CNN/ORC
Poll found:

22      Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War
(New Haven: Yale University Press). It was not just the five US brigades that changed the situation in
Iraq during the surge. What mattered was the show of US resolve, which enabled the Sunni to stand
up to Al Qaeda in Iraq, along with JAM leaving the field for its own, separate reasons.
23      David E. Johnson, “What Are You Prepared to Do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch
Between Ends, Ways, and Means in Afghanistan—and in the Future,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 34, no. 5 (May 2011): 383-401. See US Department of the Army and US Marine Corps,
Counterinsurgency, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the
Army and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2006), 1-13, which notes: “Twenty counterinsurgents per
1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.
. . . As in any conflict, the size of the force needed to defeat an insurgency depends on the situation.” There is an ongoing debate about the relevance of these ratios. See, for example, Jeffrey A.
Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine,”
Security Studies 20, no. 4 (2011): 556-591. One could argue that they were not met across Iraq during
the surge, but within Baghdad, considered by many to be the center of gravity of the war, there were
approximately 131,000 US-Iraqi security forces in a city with a population of some 7,000,000, which
came close to the doctrinal ratio. Interestingly, these ratios do not appear in the 2014 version of the
US Army-Marine Corps FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.
24      Greg Jaffe and David Nakamura, “Obama Agrees to Slow US Troop Withdrawal from
Afghanistan,” Washington Post, March 24, 2015.
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Americans see ISIS as a bigger threat to the United States than Iran, Russia,
North Korea or China. . . . Overall, 68% say ISIS is a very serious threat,
compared with just 39% who say so about Iran, 32% about North Korea,
25% on Russia and 18% on China. Nearly 9 in 10 see ISIS as at least a
moderately serious threat.”25

The argument to the American people for greater US involvement in the fight to defeat the Islamic State is straight forward: Absent
the introduction of US ground forces, the success of the US strategy
is inextricably tied to means—the ISF, Shi’a militias backed by Iran,
and the Peshmerga— whose capabilities and competence for the task
is questionable, as are for some of them their increasingly retaliatory
methods against Sunnis. If the ISF fails, the Islamic State will receive a
boost in prestige and recruiting appeal, thus increasing its threat to the
region, US friends and allies, and possibly even the homeland. If we recognize the inability of the ISF to defeat the Islamic State, the alternative
approach to employing US ground combat forces would be continued
strategic patience and kicking the can down the road. This course is also
problematic, given that it will surely increase an already sizable Iranian
influence and presence in Iraq and create even more concern in the
region about US commitment and credibility.
In the words of retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger, “a broad
chasm gapes between what the United States accomplished and what it
aspired to do in the wake of the 9/11 attack.”26 Why is that? My sense
is that is the responsibility of the military to provide expert advice to
civilians on the necessary means to attain policy ends is either not being
fully expressed, being shaped in ways to make it palatable to the recipient, or being ignored because it conflicts with a broader policy agenda.
Nevertheless, whatever the reason, it boggles the mind that a commander could offer a plan to the president for Afghanistan that failed
to address the three critical mandates of our own doctrine: adequate
security force to population ratios, denial of sanctuary for the adversary,
and a legitimate host nation government. A “we will do the best we can
with what means we get,” is something other than expert military advice
and a formula for disaster.
But this caution was not put forward on Afghanistan. Indeed, the
opposite happened. President Obama specifically wanted an answer
to the fundamental question about the strategy: could it succeed with
the forces the president was willing to commit and in the timeframe
specified. Jonathan Alter, in his book The Promise: President Obama, Year
One, writes that President Obama specifically addressed these issues with
General David A. Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command and
General McChrystal’s commander:
[President Obama]: I want you to be honest with me. You can do this in
18 months?
[General Petraeus]: Sir, I’m confident we can train and hand over to the
ANA (Afghan National Army) in that time frame.
25      Jennifer Agiesta, “CNN/ORC Poll: ISIS a Bigger Threat Than Iran, Russia,” CNN, April 22,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/22/politics/cnn-orc-poll-isis-iran-russia/index.html.
26      Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt, 2014), 420.
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Alter also writes that Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen agreed
with General Petraeus’s assessment.27
Every war college student learns about the tools available to policy
makers to meet strategic ends—Diplomatic, Information, Military,
Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL).”
When the critical moment in a policy occurs that the other than military elements are not achieving the policy ends, policy continues, as
Clausewitz reminds us, “with the addition of other means.”28 These
means are military capability and capacity. Absent a rigorous and
forthright assessment— and commitment— of the means required to
accomplish the strategic ends policy will be placed at risk. This is the
critical juncture we are rapidly approaching in Iraq and the broader
Middle East.
It is time for strategic clarity. An ISF military failure against the
Islamic State or a protracted delay in defeating the Islamic State could
unhinge US policy in the region and provide the Islamic State with a
significant boost in credibility. One option is to revise our policy goal
to accord with the means we have devoted to the strategy: degrade
and contain the Islamic State. Indeed, there are reasonable arguments
regarding cultural, political, and military considerations for doing just
that. If, however, our policy actually requires the defeat of the Islamic
State, which I believe it does, then we need to provide the necessary
means—competent US ground forces at the core of a joint, combined
arms team—to realize our policy objectives.
The advance of the Islamic State into Iraq should also force a
rethinking of our broader national security strategy and force posture.
The central issue is this: desired policy outcomes in the fight against the
Islamic State—and in the Middle East and elsewhere—are being compromised by the continued reluctance to put US “boots on the ground”
in a direct combat role. In part, this is because of the current strategy
of rebalancing to the Pacific to contend with a rising China. This is
important, but it should not divert our attention from the rest of the
world. The collapse of the Yemeni government, the chaos in Syria and
Libya, an ever present threat in North Korea, and Russian adventurism
in the Ukraine require a broader discussion about the military means
necessary to attain US policy objectives worldwide. Air strikes, counterterrorism with drones, and special operations raids against high value
targets create immediate, but transitory effects—what has been termed
by Israelis “mowing the grass.” They are also clearly less risky than committing ground combat forces. Nevertheless, while these stand-off and
small-scale operations might attain short term political objectives, they
most often do not achieve or support the longer term policy ends of
creating enduring conditions of stability and security we seek in the
world. Nor do they deter aggression and assure partners and allies. This
is the role of US ground forces.
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The decision to commit US ground forces to the war against the
Islamic State will be extremely difficult for US policymakers, given
the burden of our recent history in Afghanistan and Iraq. These counterinsurgency wars are not analogous to the challenges posed by the
Islamic State. It is the job of military professionals to explain why the
current ways and means in the war against the Islamic State will likely
lead to policy failure. They must also tell those they advise that strategic
success demands the commitment of US ground forces. These forces
are not merely “boots on the ground,” but the competent professionals
required to defeat the Islamic State. Accepting the nature the war we are
in, understanding the way in which it must be prosecuted, and undertaking a clear and comprehensive assessment of the means necessary for
strategic success will make apparent the need to commit US ground
combat forces. The clock is ticking and the stakes are high in Iraq—and
elsewhere.

